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I. Introduction
Recently, the American Law Institute ("ALI") determined
that the product liability sections of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, specifically section 402A, needed revision. It appointed
Professor James Henderson of Cornell University Law School
and Professor Aaron Twerski of Brooklyn Law School as
Reporters. The proposed revisions were submitted to the ALI's
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successfully tried cases against many major manufactures, including cases involving
medical appliances, drug and vaccines, motor vehicles, agricultural and construction
equipment, as well as, chemicals.
He is a graduate of the University of Iowa Law School and practices with the firm
of Krass, Monroe, Schmidt, Moxness & Gibson, P.A.
tt Mark R Kosieradzki is a partner in the Minneapolis law firm of Sieben, Grose,
VonHoltum, McCoy & Carey, Ltd. He is the immediate past President of the
Minnesota Trial Lawyers and has been a member of the Board of Governors since 1987
and the American Trial Lawyers Board of Governors since 1995. He is certified as a
civil trial advocate by the National Board of Trial Advocacy and as a Civil Trial
Specialist by the civil litigation section of the Minnesota State Bar Association. He has
been a member of the faculty of the National College of Advocacy since 1989 and is
an author of numerous publications in the area of trial practice.
ttt The author is currently head of the Appellate Department at Sieben, Grose,
VonHoltum McCoy & Carey, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota. She earned her BA from
the College of St. Thomas in 1989 and herJ.D. from the University of Minnesota in
1992.
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membership at its meeting in May of 1994. These proposals
generated considerable controversy and widespread criticism and
were, accordingly, referred to its Member Consultative Group
for further study.' These proposals remain under consideration.
The selection of Henderson and Twerski as Reporters was
significant in that both are well known for their long-standing
conservative philosophy regarding product liability issues,2
particularly in design and warning/instruction defect cases.
The Reporters have been accused of using the revision process
inappropriately to accomplish tort reform.3 They have received
extensive criticism because the revisions do not accurately state
a consensus of existing product liability law.4 The revisions also

1. Larry S. Stewart, The ALI and Products Liability: 'Restatement' or 'Reform'?, TRIAL,
Sept. 1994, at 28. Stewart notes that the effect of this vote was to delay action on the
first eight sections of the Restatement until 1995. Id. at 31 n.3.
2. See Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution: Rebuilding BarrierstoJury Trial
in the ProposedRestatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043, 107374 (1994);JerryJ. Phillips, Achilles'Hee4 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265-66 (1994). Corboy
notes that Professor Henderson has stated that he "has been on record for almost 20
years as opposed to expansionary trends in products liability ... [and] has testified
many times in support of products liability reform before both the Congress and
numerous state legislatures." Corboy, supra, at 1046 n.18 (citing Theodore Eisenberg
& James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 731, 740 n.33 (1992)).
3. See Corboy, supra note 2, at 1073-74; Bruce S. Kaufman, Attorneys Spar Over
Restatement (Third) of Torts; ATLA to Mobilize Opposition to ALI Project, 22 PROD. SAFETY
& LIABILITY REP. (BNA) 436, 437 (Apr. 22, 1994); Stewart, supra note 1, at 29; see also
Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALl ProductLiability Proposals:Progressor Anachronism?, 61 TENN.
L. REV. 1105, 1109-10 (1994) ("[T]he Reporters... propose not only to modify section
402A, but to subordinate negligence and warranty law to these modifications as well.
. . ."); Phillips, supra note 2, at 1274 ("What the proposed Restatement promises is not
certainty, but a decidedly conservative approach to products liability, to the substantial
detriment of the consumer.").
4. See, e.g., Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restating the Restatement
(Second), Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REv. 411 (1993) (disagreeing with the
Reporters' characterization of the state of the existing law); see also Howard Klemme,
Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts
(Third): ProductsLiability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1173 (1994). Professor Klemme states that
the Reporters "decided to follow their own instrumentalist views rather than the
dominant case law on the subject and to reintroduce 19th-century concepts of fault into
modern products liability law. ... " Id. Professor Klemme further concluded that
"[f] ewer than half the cases cited in the Reporters' Note to comment c... support the
propositions for which they are cited." Id. at 1177. Gray states that the proposals
"reach far beyond" the existing Section 402A and have little authority in existing case
law. Gray, supra note 3, at 1105. Professor Twerski apparently has conceded that the
referral of these proposals to the Member Consultative Group was motivated by the
absence of "case law backing our position." See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 436.
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have been criticized as being inconsistent with basic notions of
justice and repugnant to the rights of consumer victims.'
Finally, the revisions have been said to be "too piecemeal for
meaningful consideration."6 The failure of the ALI to approve
these proposals and their referral for further study was apparently in direct response to the storm of controversy that these
proposals generated.
The major departures from existing law are as follows:
1. The apparent elimination of negligence as a basis of
recovery in manufacturing defect cases7 and a return
to
8
negligence in design and warning defect cases;
2. The rejection of the "consumer expectation" test as a
primary guideline to the determination of product
defectiveness;9 and
3. The requirement of proof of the existence of a "reasonable alternative design" as a pre-condition to recovery in
a design defect case.' 0
II.

Distinction Between Manufacturing Defects and Design
Defects
The Reporters divide product defects into three categories.
They are defects in (1) manufacture, (2) design, and (3)
warnings/instructions. Section 2 of the revised Restatement then
treats manufacturing defects differently from design and
warning/instruction defects, using a "departure from design"
standard for manufacturing defect cases and a "risk-utility
balancing test" for design and warning/instruction defects."

Professor Henderson is reported to have stated that "the council believed we were way

ahead of the case law." Id.
5. Stewart, supra note 1, at 30.
6. Stewart, supra note 1, at 29; see also Corboy, supra note 2, at 1086 ("The
Tentative Draft, although lengthy, is not comprehensive."); Klemme, supra note 4, at
1175.
7. See Gray, supra note 3, at 1109-13.
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
9. Corboy, supra note 2, at 1088-89.
10. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8, § 2(b).
11. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8, § 2. Section 2(a) states that "a product
contains a manufacturing defect when [it] departs from its intended design even
though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product." Id. § 2(a). Section 2(b) states that "a product is defective in design when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller." Id. § 2(b).
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This distinction was apparently grounded in the basic
premise that while correction was needed in the area of design
and warnings, no change was needed with respect to pure
manufacturing defects.' 2 Unfortunately, the Reporters provided no clear definition of a manufacturing defect, nor clarified
the distinction in any meaningful way from design and warning
defects. 3 It is unclear whether this lack of definition is due to
oversight or difficulty in crafting a workable definition.
Various commentators have expressed the view that the
distinction between manufacturing and design defect is "an
illusion," 4 "slippery,"15 and "no longer tenable." 6 The revisions magnify the confusion by setting out a single standard for
manufacturing defects which define it in terms of a "design"
problem, stating that "a product contains a manufacturing
defect when the product departs from its intended design even
though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and
marketing of the product." 7
Accordingly, the Reporters'
definition of a manufacturing defect (as one which deviates
from its intended design) differs from normal parlance and
usage, in which a manufacturing defect is generally considered
one which contains a flaw in materials or workmanship,
irrespective of its design.
Prior to these revisions the distinction was not as important.
However, the application of significantly different standards to
these separate areas has now made these definitions critical,
creating an issue which, if not addressed in the revisions, may
potentially result in years of confusion and the need for
extensive judicial clarification. 8 One legal scholar has characterized this problem as the "Achilles' heel" of the revisions. 9

12. See Gray, supra note 3, at 1109; see also Corboy, supra note 2, at 1088.
13. See Corboy, supra note 2, at 1090-91; Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer
Expectations in Product Strict Liability Actionsfor Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 1189, 1193 (1994).
14. Corboy, supra note 2, at 1089.
15. Jerry J. Phillips, The Standard For DeterminingDefectiveness in Products Liability,
46 U. CIN. L. REv. 101, 104 (1977); see also Phillips, supra note 2, at 1268-69 n.2.
16. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, LIABILITY & POLy' 84, 209
(1988).
17. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8, § 2(a).
18. See Corboy, supra note 2, at 1090.
19. Phillips, supra note 2, at 1267.
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III.

Change in the Role of Negligence

The Reporters initially sought totally to eliminate negligence-based product liability claims. 20 The extent to which this
goal was reached is unclear, and the drafts are subject to
deserved criticism for their lack of clarity on this issue. It has
been suggested that the revisions subordinate negligence and
warranty law and may even totally eliminate negligence as an
optional basis of recovery in all manufacturing defect cases.2 '
If so, this is a clear departure from existing Minnesota law, at
least in the area of manufacturing defects, where it is clear that
consumers now have the option of proceeding
under either a
22
strict liability or a negligence theory.
In sharp contrast, the provisions relating to design and
warning defects seem to move in the opposite direction (i.e.,
toward negligence) by employing the risk-utility standard. 3
This standard focuses the jury's inquiry on the conduct of the
manufacturer by defining the defect in terms of whether the
manufacturer could have foreseen and reduced or avoided the
harm. It is quite difficult to understand or appreciate the
inconsistency of the Reporters in adopting a definition of design
defect in these cases which border on negligence, yet rejecting
negligence as an optional theory in manufacturing defect cases.
This is especially true since there has been little, if any, criticism
by the courts and scholars of well-established negligence
principles and traditional warranty concepts in dealing with
product liability cases. 24 It has been suggested that the Reporters' primary motivation was simply to adopt a standard in
each area which would increase the difficulty of recovery for
injured consumers.2 5

20. Stewart, supra note 1, at 29.
21. See Gray, supra note 3, at 1109-13.
22. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984); Hauenstein
v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 1984); MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES AS'N
COMM. ONJURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTAJURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG

114, in 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE (3d ed. 1986) 1, at 75-76 [hereinafterJURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES].

23.
24.
25.

See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8, § 2 cmt. a.
Gray, supra note 3, at 1109.
Kaufman, supra note 3, at 438.
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IV. Elimination of the Consumer Expectation Test
Consumer expectations apparently have no role in thejury's
determination of a product's defectiveness in these revisions.26
While the Reporters have stated that consumer expectations may
still be considered, it is impossible to find even a scintilla of that
concept in the proposed language. Instead, the focus is entirely
on the manufacturer. A product's design or warnings are
considered defective if, and only if, the manufacturer could have
foreseen the risks and reduced or avoided them by adoption of
a reasonable alternative design.27 The expectations of the
consumer have no role in this determination.28
Again, this is a departure from existing Minnesota law.
With regard to manufacturing defects, Minnesota clearly
embraces the consumer expectation test. In Bilotta v. Kelley,29
the court said, "The ... consumer expectation instructions,
which focus only on the condition of the product, are appropriate for this type of case, since the manufacturer's conduct is
irrelevant.""0 The revisions focus exclusively on the manufacturer's conduct.
In the area of design and warnings, the revisions again
differ from existing Minnesota law. Minnesota's pattern jury
instruction on design defects, which presumably accurately
reflects Minnesota law, adopts a "reasonable care balancing test"
which fails to place exclusive emphasis on either the expectations of the manufacturer or the consumer.31 The Minnesota
instruction focuses on the reasonable care of the manufacturer,
but arguably requires the manufacturer to be mindful of the
expectations of the consumer and employ reasonable care to
avoid unreasonable danger "to the consumer."32 In contrast,
the revisions seem to focus exclusively on the manufacturer's
ability to foresee and avoid the risks of harm in the product.
This exclusive focus on the conduct of the manufacturer
has been sharply criticized as a total rejection of basic strict

26. See Corboy, supra note 2, at 1088-89; Stewart, supra note 1, at 29.
27. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8, § 2(b).
28. See Corboy, supra note 2, at 1088-89; Stewart, supra note 1, at 29.
29. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
30. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984).
31. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, supra note 22,JIG 117, at 81.
32. Id.
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liability concepts and a blatant return to old fault-based concepts. 3 3 More importantly, it is totally inconsistent with basic
logic and fairness. It allows the manufacturer, who typically
caters to every whim and caprice of the consumer in designing
a product that is purchased based on its attractiveness to the
consumer, to totally ignore the expectations of the consumer
with respect to safety. In short, it allows the fox to guard the
chicken coop.
V. Requirement of Proof of Reasonable Alternative Design
Perhaps the most hotly debated and most severely criticized
proposal is that contained in section 2 which requires proof of
a "reasonable alternative design" ("RAD") to establish that a
product is defective in design. 34 Critics view this as an increased evidentiary burden on consumers to produce, at a
minimum, competent proof of a workable and feasible alternative. Others fear that some courts may even require the
consumer to actually produce a workable prototype.3 5
The absolute requirement of proof of a RAD has been
criticized for its apparent limitation on recovery for defective
products with regard to which there is no safe alternative.36
Additionally, this change seems to deviate from conventional

33. See Klemme, supra note 4, at 1173; Phillips, supra note 2, at 1273-75; Frank J.
Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Reasonable
Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1407, 1428 (1994); see also Little, supra
note 13, at 1189.
34. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 8, § 2. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets
in their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third
Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1429, 1438-39 (1994) (concluding that this requirement
is outcome determination and neither "advisable or necessary"). The author also states
that it "betrays the goals of 402A by exempting the most useless and dangerous
products from strict products liability." Id. at 1432.
35. Several scholars have stated that the proposals are subject to interpretation that
the plaintiff risks dismissal for failure to present evidence of a reasonable alternative
design. See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 33, at 1407. In one extreme case, a federal district
court excluded the testimony of a plaintiffs expert witness because he had not
produced a complete, testable prototype model incorporating the reasonable
alternative design. Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (relying on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786
(1993)).
36. See Little, supra note 13, at 1194; see also Wertheimer, supra note 34, at 1435.
Wertheimer notes that Comment (c) of Council Draft No. 1A recognized the possibility
that some product categories might be defective in the absence of a RAD. Id. at 1437.
However, this recognition was buried in the comments and not reflected in the text.
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philosophy even more than the rejection of the consumer
expectation standard because it imposes upon the ordinary
consumer an unreasonable burden of re-designing the product.3 7 This occurs, despite the fact that the basic philosophy
underlying the development of the doctrine of strict liability was
based on a recognition that the typical consumer has neither the
economic resources nor the expertise to evaluate the safety of
the many products in the marketplace and re-design those
determined to be substandard. Accordingly, strict liability, as a
matter of proper social and economic management, shifted the
burden to the party best able to bear it, the manufacturer.3 8
This proposed shift in burden amounts to a total rejection of
the basic philosophy upon which the doctrine of strict liability
was based.
Further, the absolute requirement of proof of a RAD as a
condition precedent to recovery will inject into products liability
litigation an entirely new issue for the courts to wrestle, namely
39
the determination of what products are alternatives to others.
In short, is a $50 stepladder an alternative to a $10 flimsy ladder
that is inherently unsafe? Is a four wheel all-terrain vehicle an
alternative to a three wheeler? Is an oral contraceptive an
alternative to an IUD? Sadly, under these revisions this determination may be outcome determinative. The revisions have been
criticized in this regard as exempting from liability dangerous
and useless products with no redeeming social value, while
subjecting those with lesser evil to liability.4°
Again, the revisions, in this regard, deviate from existing
Minnesota law. The Reporters incorrectly list Minnesota in the
camp of those jurisdictions requiring proof of a reasonably safer
design, citing Kalio v. Ford Motor Co.41 Instead, the court
expressly stated in Kalio that "[a] Ithough normally evidence of
a safer alternative design will be presented initially by the

37. See Wertheimer, supra note 34, at 1432, 1449; see also Corboy, supra note 2,
at 1093-96; Little, supra note 13, at 1190.
38. See Vandall, supra note 33, at 1423. Vandall concludes that this revision
retreats from the cornerstone philosophy of strict liability and ignores economic
realities by placing the burden on the consumer. Id.
39. Wertheimer, supra note 34, at 1437. Wertheimer characterizes this issue as that
of "product categories," noting that a narrow characterization of the product category
would affect the result. Id.
40. See id.
41. 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
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plaintiff, it is not necessarily required in all cases."42 This
serious misstatement of Kallio is not isolated. The Reporters
have been criticized generally for their misinterpretation and
mischaracterization of the state of existing law.43
The existence of a RAD is not a necessary element of the
risk-utility test. It has been employed by many courts without
considering the availability of an alternative design as an
absolute requirement or as simply one of many factors."
Instead, the risk-utility test is essentially a comparative approach
which can allow the jury to evaluate many different factors,
including both the manufacturer's and the consumer's expectations, as well as the availability of alternative designs without
being a rigid condition precedent to recovery.45 Accordingly,
the Reporters' emphasis on only two such factors seems highly
inappropriate.
VI. Conclusion
There is no need to reshape the law of products liability so
radically as to retreat to pre-strict liability concepts.' The ALI
Reporters, after extensive study, determined that "there appears
to be little or no foundation for the common diagnosis that
erosion of the fault principle as the basis of tort liability has
attracted surplus numbers of dubious claims into the tort
system." 47 They also determined that "there never was a true
general explosion in tort litigation, or at least that any incipient
trend has subsided."48
A Restatement should not attempt to be a vehicle for social
reform. It should attempt to define and "restate" or summarize
and capsulize the law, rather than to remake, reshape, and
revise it. This revision misses that mark by a considerable
margin. This revision is piecemeal and incomplete. It creates

42. Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Minn. 1987).
43. SeeVandall, supra note 33, at 1408-09 (disputing the Reporters' statement that
a majority ofjurisdictions require proof of a RAD); see, e.g., Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.SA., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 16-17 (Wis. 1984), reconsiderationdenied, (Feb. 5, 1985)
(rejecting the need for proof of a RAD.)

44. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 1271.
45. Id.
46. See Little, supra note 13.
47. 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
Reporter's Study at 4 (1991) (quoted in Corboy, supra note 2, at 1076).
48. Id. at 5 (quoted in Corboy, supra note 2, at 1076).
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a distinction between areas which then remain totally undefined.
A Restatement should clarify the law rather than confuse it.
This proposal does not accomplish that result.
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